完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Jeong-Yoo Kim | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-24T05:40:12Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-24T05:40:12Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2002/08/01 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | issn16070704 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.fcu.edu.tw/handle/2376/2182 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Two consumers sequentially purchase at most one unit of some homogeneous good from a monopolist who knows the state of nature, either high or low. I characterize a rationing equilibrium at which the high-type monopolist produces only one unit and rations customers, whereas the low-type monopolist serves customers by producing two units. | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | 逢甲大學 | |
| dc.format.extent | 8 | |
| dc.language.iso | 英文 | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | international journal of business and economics | |
| dc.relation.isversionof | Volume1No2 | |
| dc.subject | rationing|quality|signals|sequential purchases | |
| dc.title | Rationing as a Signal | |
| dc.type | 期刊篇目 | |
| 分類: | Volume01,No.2 | |
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