完整後設資料紀錄
| DC 欄位 | 值 | 語言 |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Andrea Fosfuri | |
| dc.contributor.author | Esther Roca | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-25T06:17:47Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2020-08-25T06:17:47Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2004/04/01 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | issn16070704 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.fcu.edu.tw/handle/2376/2216 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | Licensing a cost-reducing innovation through a royalty has been shown to be superior to_x000D_ licensing by means of a fixed fee for an incumbent licensor. This note shows that this result relies crucially on the assumption that the incumbent licensor can sell its cost-reducing innovation to all industry players. If, for any reason, only some competitors could be reached_x000D_ through a licensing contract, then a fixed fee might be optimally chosen. | |
| dc.description.sponsorship | 逢甲大學 | |
| dc.format.extent | 7 | |
| dc.language.iso | 英文 | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | international journal of business and economics | |
| dc.relation.isversionof | Volume3No1 | |
| dc.subject | licensing contract|Cournot competition|strategic effects | |
| dc.title | Optimal Licensing Strategy: Royalty or Fixed Fee? | |
| dc.type | 期刊篇目 | |
| 分類: | Volume03,No.1 | |
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